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5I.  A Model of Threshold for imitation to innovation, in the process of reverse-engineering 
imported intermediate goods from North to South, and where I introduce consumer bias.
A. Abstract:
Let us follow Romer’s framework (1990) for the intermediate goods sector.
We assume the following.
A North operated multinational firm is implanted in the North and the South.
The North designs and makes the higher quality products. In the South, its manufacturing 
divisions produce intermediate and final goods of lower quality competing against the South 
locals. 
The multinational is constrained by the South government to transfer a certain amount of know-
how Hns and technology xns. It also benefits from the large pool of cheaper labor, and leads the 
efforts of innovation in the South. 
Final goods and intermediate goods are tradable, although some restrictions may apply on the part 
which is technologically advanced.
The countries, independently of the multinational and of its South competitor, still produce non 
tradable goods, to which quality rankings do not apply, because they depend on local taste. The 
workers in the North and the South thereby benefit from both types of goods, tradable and non 
tradable.
Competitors in the South reverse-engineer the goods produced in the South and compete with the 
North on the final goods market which may be tariff protected, selling back to the North operated 
multinational firm, or on the intermediate goods market in the South.
To the difference of Currie et al (1999, 1996), but similarly to our first model’s assumption that 
the rate of absorption of the North’s human capital is endogenous to the importance of foreign 
capital investment, the present model inspired by Ahmid Datta’s model illustrates the mechanism 
of endogenous absorption through reverse-engineering of foreign designed goods.
Conclusions of the original Ahmid Datta’s 2005 model were that a threshold of accumulated 
human capital knowledge must exists, before the local human capital and imported technology 
become substitutes from being complements.
We clearly reach to the same conclusion here.
This finding is consistent with the role given to human capital by Keller 1996.
We here strive to demonstrate our first model hypothesis by analyzing:
 The effect of the multinational’s decision of foreign investment on the threshold 
(imitation to innovation state).
6 The effect of international migration of qualified workers on the threshold.
 The effect of Northern consumer’s bias for local made products, on the threshold.
 How does the constraint imposed on the multinational to transfer technology 
and know-how, translate on its profits, on its market share in the South?
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In the above diagram are portrayed the activities of production, imitation and innovation.
The dotted line separates the activities of the multinational from those of its south competitors.
From the standpoint of the multinational’s activities (all actors belong to the multinational):
We assume that the Innovator in South has an interest in competing with its North counterpart, 
yet it must also compete with its local competitor in order to keep a leading edge on the 
innovation in the South and retain the best talent.
Below a certain threshold, it competes with its local competitor.
Past a certain threshold I*>A, it competes with its North counterpart.
From the standpoint of the multinational’s competitor’s activities:
The Innovator in South past a certain threshold I*>A competes with the multinational in the 
North.
7B. Model for the (North) Multinational:
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(1)            Consolidated Production
This North production function of final goods is a constant returns to scale Cobb-Douglas 
technology where A is the index of the most recently invented good, representing the stock of 
knowledge in the north.
The North multinational employs:
 )( NNL  innovative workers in the North to produce in the North for the 
North using xnn technology.
 )( ,N cSL Imitating workers to produce in the South for the North and the 
South based on the South knowledge capital.
 )( ,N iSL Innovative workers for products no yet imitated by the South.
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production equation.
 , represent the market shares of the multinational, in the South, of its (imposed) imported 
goods xns and on xss.. 
K is measured in the units of consumption goods foregone, or  K(t)=Y(t)-C(t)=I(t).
As Ahmid-Datta note in the original article, a majority of goods finding their way to the US 
markets from China are either final goods, or intermediate goods that are the outcome of 
outsourcing arrangement by US based firms, rather than exports of cloned intermediate goods by 
independent Chinese firms. 
In the North:
AHA Ann
This knowledge, a non rival public good is available to all and the productivity of research is 
linearly related to the existing knowledge stock and to human capital.
The intermediate goods sector buys the innovator’s designs A selling its transformed capital 
goods to the final good producers. 
8It is assumed that the intermediate sector, which is both the innovator and producer of capital 
goods, is monopolistically competitive, appropriating the returns from R&D.
C. Model for the South competitors of the multinational:
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The South competitor employs:
 ( )SSL  from the South to imitate in the South for the South’s consumption or the 
North’s.
 )( ,S iNL  from the South to innovate for the South and past a threshold to the North 
as well. 
Here the key issue is that the process of acquiring knowledge is done through reverse engineering 
of imported good and through the decision to invest abroad.
Therefore the question is how to relate the production technologies xss to xsn and xnn.
We choose   1)()()( ixsnHssHsnixss                                                 (3)                                         
The one factor over which the multinational has control is Hsn, the level of human capital, 
which is devoted to the imitation process [I, I*] and imposed by the South to the 
multinational.
Hsn = 1- Hn                                                                                                      (4)
Past a certain threshold in Hsn, the dependence on xsn decreases and signals the onset of 
innovation.
Meanwhile, the activity of innovation in the South by both the multinational and its competitor 
leads to an increase in the global knowledge of the South: 
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Initially, the South lacks the know-how and resources to process A, even though A, taking the 
form of public knowledge is feely available.
 I<A measures the technology gap of the South, while I* = [I, A].
It is also noticeable that when φ->1, the activity of innovation becomes 
IHssHsnstI  )()1(|/ 
9D. Preferences:
Preferences in each country i are given by inter-temporal utility function of the Ramsey type,
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where i= N, S, where ρi is the rate of time preference, σi is the elasticity of inter-temporal 
substitution and C
i 
is final goods consumption. Preferences enter balanced growth path through 
the Euler solution to equation (7):  iiriCiCi  /)(/ 
Such equation indicates that in the absence of capital movements, here only from the North to the 
South, the interest rates won’t equalize leaving the open possibility of different growth rates.
E. Employee Migration Patterns:
We now concentrate on how the decisions taken by employees of the intermediate and 
research sectors of the multinational affect North and South growth.
The formulation is enabled because the multinational of firm which employs the latter, may 
facilitate their transfer from one division to another, according to its needs.
We assume:
 To be able to work in the North, the South employee must belong to the South branch of 
the multinational.
 Belonging to the multinational will increase the cultural factor of the employee; thereby 
reducing its interest in staying in the South, since it may not find there the quality of 
goods it requires.
 A North employee will move to the South branch if its decrease in salary is 
overcompensated by its gain in utility due to the lower price of non tradable goods, xss.
                                     Labor innovating for the South 
Competitor
A
            
                       Labor innovating for the  
Multinational in the South
B
Labor innovating for the Multinational  
In the North     C
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Moreover, we assume that xns is tradable: it is being imported by the multinational under 
constraint by the foreign government.
The maximization of profits in this case (as seen in paragraph G.) lead to:
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The North gets the accumulated knowledge capital in the South for free, while in counterpart it is 
forced to invest in innovative sectors both to take the edge in the local market and also because of 
the foreign government’s policies.
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We assume that the multinational South division and its South competitor play a competition a la 
Cournot on two markets, the North multinational innovative sector and its counterpart, the North 
multinational imitative sector and its counterpart.
The companies play a Cournot game, based on the first mobile factor, xsn, under constraint 
that they maximize the budget constraint of consumers. 
Max in xsn:
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In an effort to identify the causes of migration, we determine the influence of bias on the 
size of technology transfers xsn.
We take in order to simplify that  
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First term decreases in phi, decreases in xsn ,              second decreases in phi, increases in 
xsn but its contribution is smaller because of the double log.,  …
Results of Mathematica Simulation:
dA/dxsn
LSIg xsn-1- g g2+ LNItH1 - xsnL-1- t t 2 +
LSI- g+gf xsn-2+H1- gLH-1+jLH1- gLH- 1 +H1 - gLH- 1 + jLH- 1 + jL+LNI- t +t f H1 - xsnL-2+H1- tLH-1+jLH1- tLH- 1 +H1 - tLH- 1 + jLH- 1 + jL
dA/dphi
LSI- g+gf xsn-1+H1- gLH-1+jLH1- gL-
LNI- t +t fH1 - xsnL-1+H1- tLH-1+jLH1 - tL-
LNI- t +t fH1 - xsnL-1+H1- tLH-1+jLH1 - tL2H- 1 + jLLog@1- xsnD+
LSI- g+gf xsn-1+H1- gLH-1+jLH1- gL2H- 1 + jLLog@xsnD
Dxsn/dphi
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H- 0.5H1 - xsnL-1+0.5H-1+jL+ 0.5xsn-1+0.5H-1+jL-
0.25H1- xsnL-1+0.5H-1+jLH- 1 + jLLog@1 - xsnD+
0.25xsn-1+0.5H-1+jLH- 1 + jLLog@xsnDL“ikj 0.25H1 - xsnL1.5 + 0.25xsn1.5 +
0.5H1- xsnL-2+0.5H-1+jLH- 1 + 0.5H- 1+ jLH- 1 + jL+
0.5xsn-2+0.5H-1+jLH- 1 +0.5H- 1 + jLH- 1 + jLy{z
(*  xsn=.4 =.5   B=.6
               xsn=.3 =.5   B=  1.4387
                            xsn=.2 =.5       B=  4.9   *)
(* xsn =.4 =.9 B= 0.449
                xsn=.4  =.7  B=.53
                       xsn=.4  =.3  B= 1.51
                                     *)
   
Overall, we find that the stronger the elasticity of substitution (bias) tilts towards the 
multinational innovative sector in the South, and the more will technology transfers take place, 
and the stronger the growth of the knowledge capital of the South.
At some point the dependency on xsn technological imports reduces which reduces the flow of 
technology transfer, therefore self equilibrating the domination of the North or the South, on the 
innovative role in the North. 
Second, the constraint by the foreign government to impose free technology transfers by the 
multinational leads to less sensitivity to bias.
A bigger (1-xsn) leads to a decrease in the rate of technology transfer to the South. d(xsn)/xsn.
One aspect to consider is also the acculturation faced by the North multinational workers in the 
South. Supposing that their joining of the North multinational in the South, leads to unanswered 
desires, xnn, intermediate goods not produced in the South. Then a negative term which is 
disappreciation and that could be proportional to (A-I), the quality gap and to the ratio between 
employees belonging the the multinational in the South and to the other locals.
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Then, clearly, we obtain in our above maximization in the technology transfer xsn a more 
accurate expression of migration.
We find that a higher disapreciation leads to more technology transfers, which in turn reduces 
disapreciation by reducing the gap between the North and South.
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We now look at a different perspective: we analyze how the multinational and its south 
competitor attract the best talent throughout the world, through the maximization of their profit in 
terms of population pools.
Therefore, instead of playing a Cournot game in xsn, we maximize this utility in the other 
essential factor: Ln, Ls which are also limited quantities.                                                                                 
Max in Ln, Ls:
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F. Models of Competition:
Here are the dynamics of the model:
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At equilibrium, it must be that there is no population transfer of migrant workers from A to B and 
from B to C.
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Moreover, the steady state populations are constant.
Therefore we rewrite:
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We obtain these factors maximizing the utility of consumers with respect to the different 
populations.
G. Solving for balanced growth in the South:
In the range [0, I] the South competitor of the multinational uses intermediate goods produced 
locally xss since transaction costs would make xns more expensive. However in the range [I, I*], 
only intermediate imported goods are available, yet these are obtained for free due to the 
multinational’s constrained transfers of technology1.
Since only the multinational creates xns, only it pays for it. Yet the South pays for xss
while the multinational doesn’t pay for it. 
Profit maximization by the perfectly competitive final goods producers in the South is 
represented as:
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which yields the demand for domestic goods xss:
  xssLsxssPs ,)1()(                                                                                         (8) 
  
  SnYS iNSnY xLxnPs ,)1()(,
Profit maximization by the multinational in the final good sector in the North is represented as:
                                                
1 Foreign Imposed transfers of Technology
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which yields the demand for domestic goods xnn and for imported goods xns:
  xnnLHxssnPn NNn)1()(,                                                                        (9)                                                                                 
  SnINSISSI xLxnPs )1()(,                                                                                          (10)       
And finally for local goods     Pss                                                                                 (11)
We now come back to the local intermediate goods producers in the South.
The profit of each firm from the sale of intermediate goods to final goods producers be they the 
multinational or its competitors is:
xssrsxssxssPsxs  )(                                                                                      (11)
Where rs*xss represents the interest cost of capital.
Maximizing (11) in xss using (8) yields the monopoly price of xss
Ps= )1/( rs                                                                                                               (12)
The flow of monopoly profits at this price is xssPsxs 
Next we determine IP the cost of imitated design. 


dxseP
t
dllrs
I
t )(
inf )(




                                                                                             (13)
Differentiating in time yields  IPrsxs                                                           (14)
)1/(/   xssrsxsPsPI
Replacing from (8) and (12) into (14) => 

/1
/2 ,)1(
rs
sLsPIS

We notice that a higher interest rate in the South reduces P
I 
as it reduces the demand for such 
investments and thus their reservation cost.
Next we determine the South demand for higher technology goods. 
The cost of imitation includes (using)
  1)()()( ixsnHssHsnixss                                                                                  (3)
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Since the North assumes the part of the cost for innovative designs, it chooses the demand 
xns.
))1(( 1 LnnHconst
w
xns
SN
HNS

                                                                          (16)
(See below)
Based on that demand, the South demand xss is found to be:

 )()))1(((
1
1
HssHsn
LnnHconst
w
xss
SN
HNS 

 
We deduce that South demand is independent on its population size.
However it is negatively correlated to the North population size as the multinational will 
decrease its technology transfers in such a case. 
The ratio 
1)1(
)(




Hsn
HssHsn
will increase with Hsn.
H. Solving for Balanced Growth in the North:
The North chooses capital transfer Hns versus Hn, and pays for innovative goods xn,s in the 
South.
Let us determine the maximum profit in xnn and xsn.
  xnnLHxssnPn NNn)1()(,                                                                        (9)                                                                                 
  xnsLxssnPs NSI)1()(,                                                                                         (10)
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The North‘s activity of imitation of higher quality goods in the South competes with that of its 
South competitor, therefore presents similar costs characteristics except for its transfer of 
(human) capital, leads to costs.
The North clearly wishes to minimize this cost, being under constraint to transfer 
technology.
Using the fact that:
)/(1
)/(2 ,)1)((




rn
nLnHP nIN
S
nIINISSNHNSi xPPHw  )(                                                                       (15)
The variable of control being Hsn, the North maximizes its profit with respect to the variable Hsn.
S
nISNSNHNSi xLnnHLssconstHw  ))1((' 
Which leads to the demand xns:  
0))1((' 1   SnISNHNS xLnnHconstw 
))1(( 1 LnnHconst
w
x
SN
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nI 
                                                                          (16)
(where Hsn<1)
Clearly, a higher transfer of human capital will lead to a much smaller transfer of 
technological goods, while a high transfer of high technology goods will reduce the transfer 
of human capital.
The total demand from the South for the North’s imported goods includes the ones used in the 
final goods production process and the ones used in imitation.
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                                     (17)
Such an expression allows us to write the South’s inverse demand for northern intermediate 
goods, which is negatively correlated to import price.
Total profits of the North’s capital goods sector are based on both these sources of demand: 
)(** xnsxnnrnxnspnsxnpnxn                                                       (17bis)
Substituting for Ps,n and Pn yields:
Function(xn,s ;  xn,n )                                                                                   (18)
Maximizing it in xsn and xnn yields equilibrium prices for both markets
18
19
II. A Model inspired by PAUL LEVINE and al. relative to the phases of transition 
between the states of Innovation, Imitation 
a. Introduction:
We wish to study in the footsteps of DAVID CURRIE, PAUL LEVINE, JOSEPH PEARLMAN,
AND MICHAEL CHU the transition from the South2 imitating and the North innovating, to the 
North innovating and the South both innovating and imitating, to the South innovating and 
imitating and the North innovating and imitating as well.
b. Notation Summary:
Throughout the paper, we use: Superscript: N North S South, Subscript: i innovation c imitation. 
For the variables and parameters: n number of varieties, x demand for variety, p price, α 
taste parameter, ε elasticity of substitution. E total expenditure, pi profits, w wage rate, L total 
labor employed, K knowledge capital, 1/a efficiency parameter for innovation, 1/ac efficiency 
parameter for copying, θ constant of proportionality to density of varieties, κ rate of assimilation
of knowledge capital from the other country, v value of firm, r rate of returns on risk less bond, ω 
relative wage ratio (wS/wN), ξ product share, c rate of copying North to South, d rate of copying 
South to North, g rate of growth, k ratio of Southern innovative knowledge capital in the North
(KS/KN), ρ discount factor.
c. Abstract:
In the North South competition, the South (as in the Ahmid Data model3) reverse engineers North
products until it reaches a state where it can itself innovate. Aside from technical skills, it must 
also incorporate management and commercial skills.
Imitation is based on the principle that it costs relatively less than innovating.
Knowledge transfers may be increased or impeded by:
- Limitation of exports of sensitive technologies (see military4)
- Difficulty of implantation of multinationals in the South
- Blocking access to the capital of Northern giants by the South capital, through protection 
measures and government intervention5.
- Restricting emigration of managers to the South, and of qualified laborers to the North
- Strengthening intellectual property rights in the South
                                                
2 South stands for developing countries like India and China, North stands for the mature developed 
countries.
3 Ahmi-Data model will be explored further down below. To the difference of our assumption here, 
knowledge capital is not assimilated from one country to another through capital transfer and foreign 
investment, but though exports.
4 The USA has passed legislation regarding sensitive technologies, industries.
5 See the case Arcelor-Mittal steel.
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- Government subsidies to innovation in the North and South
- The relative quantities of North and South capital
- The relative easiness of copying versus imitating.
- The rate of assimilation of one region’s innovation into the capital of the other
In addition to Grossman and Helpman, we create a model which allows the South to become an 
accomplished innovator in its own right, and introduce the eventuality of the North that will 
imitate. Moreover, we model the rate of assimilation, to the difference of  Paul Levine et al., with 
the transfers of capital from the South to the North and vice-versa, amounting to the degree in 
which the capital is intertwined.
We assume that taking control of a company leads by some measure to an accrued right in 
decision making and grants access to its technology6.
Finally, the more the capital is intertwined the higher the rate of assimilation.
The lower the parameter ac/a is, the easier it is to copy rather than innovate in the South. Thus for 
sufficiently low κ and ac/a (low assimilation and low cost of copying), a region of imitation 
dominates. For an intermediate range, a region of both innovation and imitation dominates.
Finally, a higher range produces a region of principal innovation.
------------------------
Dans de cadre de la concurrence Nord-Sud, comme dans les modèles Ahmi-Dta 7, le Sud re-
ingénie les produits qu’il importe du Nord jusqu'à ce qu’il atteigne un etat ou il puisse innover de 
son propre chef.
Mis a part les compétences techniques, il doit incorporer des compétences manégariales et 
commerciales.
Imiter est base sur le principe que cela coûte moins cher qu’innover.
Les transferts de connaissances et savoir-faire sont accélères ou restreints par:
- La limitation des exportations de technologies sensibles (militaires8).
- La difficulté d’implantation des multinationales au Sud.
- Le blocage de l’accès au capital des géants du Nord au capital du Sud, par l’intermédiaire
de mesures de protection et l’intervention des gouvernements9.
- La Restriction de l’émigration de Managers vers le Sud, et de travailleurs compétents
vers le Nord.
- La mise en vigueur et application des droits de la propriété intellectuelle au Sud.
- Les subsides gouvernementales a l’innovation au Nord et au Sud.
- Les quantités relatives de capital (ou indifféremment, connaissance, capital humain a la 
Romer) au Nord comme au Sud.
- La facilite relative d’imiter plutôt que d’innover.
- Le taux de pénétration de ce capital économique ou humain d’un pays a l’autre.
                                                
6 Acquiring and Buying out competitors, in a race for technological leadership.
7 Ahmi-Data model will be explored further down below. To the difference of our assumption here, 
knowledge capital is not assimilated from one country to another through capital transfer and foreign 
investment, but though exports.
8 The USA has passed legislation regarding sensitive technologies, industries.
9 See the case Arcelor-Mittal steel.
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En complément a Grossman et Helpman, nous créons un modèle qui permet au Sud de devenir un 
innovateur de son propre chef, et introduisons la possibilité que le Nord puisse imiter le Sud.
De plus, nous modélisons le taux de pénétration, a la différence de Paul Levine et al. , non comme 
variable exogène, mais endogène aux transferts de capitaux du Sud vers le Nord et vice-versa, c a 
d le degré auquel le capital est internationalise.
Nous estimons que la prise de contrôle d’une société amène a un droit participatif aux prises de 
décision, et dans l’accession a sa technologie10.
Par ailleurs, plus le capital est internationalise et plus le taux de pénétration du capital d’un pays 
vers l’autre est fort. 
Plus le ratio ca/a est bas et plus il este facile de copier que d’imiter au Sud.
Ainsi, for un taux κ (taux de pénétration) suffisamment bas et de même pour ac/a, une région
d’imitation domine. Pour des valeurs intermédiaires, la région imite et innove. Enfin pour des 
valeurs élevées, la région se spécialise dans l’innovation.
d. The model:
There are two regions: North and South. Both economies consist of a monopolistic competitive 
production sector and a competitive sector conducting R&D. nN varieties were invented and 
are now produced in the North. nS are produced in the South and of these nSi originated in the 
South from innovation and nSc
were copied from the North (where the subscripts i and c represent innovation
and copying respectively). The same is respectively true for the South.
Thus the total number of varieties available to consumers in both regions is n = nN + nS = 
nNi+nNc + nSi+ nSc
.
The elasticity of substitution in country North ε=1/(1-α) where α is the taste parameter, and β in 
the South. The reason why we may differentiate between the two markets’ elasticity substitution
is that:
Even though it my be freely decided that products be produced in either countries through 
delocalization or foreign direct investment, these products may not be freely consumed 
because of trade barriers, quotas, product differentiation adapted to the local market.
Therefore markets in the North and South are clearly segmented.
As a traditional result of the cross industry and within industry static optimization we find 
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A novel feature is the introduction of capital aside from labor as a factor of production. 
Indeed, we consider that another means to acquire knowledge, apart from reverse engineering is 
to acquire participations in a firm’s capital.
To translate this argument, we shall reason as a multinational which chooses to invest:
 A certain part of its capital in the North and the South
                                                
10 Acquiring and Buying out competitors, in a race for technological leadership.
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 A certain percentage of its workforce in the North and the South
 Reach or Maintain innovative and production based roles for both the North and South
The board will optimize the maximum value of the firm.
Let us assume by default that in bloc b (North or South), the firm belonging to the multinational 
produces with one unit of labor, and South capital; let us assume that a similar process occurs in 
bloc a, with North capital.
Then the operating profit of the multinational producing varieties in bloc b and varieties in bloc a 
would be given by:
)1()()( KnrsxwpKnrnxwp SSj
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j
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j
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j
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j
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  where rn and rs are 
the remuneration of North and South capital invested in the firm j.
The multinational’s profit maximizing price and profits subject to demand given by (1)
gives: /NNNj wpp   and /SSSj wpp  where α, β are local North and South 
elasticities of substitution.
Indeed, the taste parameter is being applied to products available locally, as products available 
abroad may not be accessible to each segregated market’s consumers.
We now assume that the capital is intertwined in a proportion a, b.
Therefore, profit of the multinational becomes:
KsbKnb
rsxwwKsaKnarnxww SSj
S
j
S
j
ns
NN
j
N
j
N
j
nn
*)1()1(
)/()1(*)1(*)/(

  
(5, 4, 3, 2)
The investments made by the multinational take the form of direct foreign investment, 
delocalization. Such an investment from abroad contributes to the economic growth as is widely 
believed among policymakers11; indeed, it grants access to new technologies, new distribution 
platforms for products, new management skills.
Following Grossman Helpman, we distinguish the North-South relative wage gap:
N
j
S
j
N
j www  in case of a small cost advantage and NjSj ww  for a wider gap.
Having two different taste parameters β, α, we modify the equilibrium to be:
N
j
S
j
N
j
N
j wwww  in case of a small cost advantage and NjNjSj www   in 
case of a large gap in international wages.
The multinational is competing against local competitors or another multinational.
In case of a wider gap, the multinational may charge ps= wN/α.
Otherwise, limit pricing will lead to ps=wS.
Now consider the R&D sectors: 
                                                
11 Foreign investment contributes to economic growth
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The rate of production of new goods in the North and the South, the transfers of production 
through copying, from the South to the North and from North to the South are given by:
/KsLnn ScNS 
/KnLnn NcSN 
(6)
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cKsLn Sc
c
S /
cKnLn Nc
c
N /
/KnLn NiiN 
The assumption ac < a captures the idea that copying is easier than innovation for a given stock of 
knowledge capital.
The general idea is that each activity in the R&D sector gives rise to both a new blueprint and an 
addition to society's stock of knowledge capital, which contains new ideas and information that 
will be useful to later generations of innovators and in our context, imitators.
We are assuming that knowledge capital is proportional to the density of varieties in the 
population in such as way that the scale effect coming from larger country’s sizes disappear due 
to coefficient θ.
In order to have a none zero innovation growth rate in either the South or the North, it is 
necessary to incorporate a spillover effect.
Here, the spill-over effect is being affected by the capital portion invested in the North and the 
South.
A general representation for innovation knowledge capital (incorporating the density as outlined 
above) is the following, adapted from Grossman & Helpman (1990):
In our case, these equations are different since the North copies and imitates and since THE
RATE OF ASSIMILATION DEPENDS ON THE PART OF THE NORTH AND SOUTH
CAPITAL INVESTED.
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κN increases as the Foreign part of South capital invested in the North increases and vice versa.
In a perfect world with freedom of capital movement, κ = inf
The equations become:
SNNN LSniLSncNniK /,/,,[   ]
(8,7)
NSSS LNniLNncSniK /,/,,[   ]
We take N  to be a(1-a) and S  to be b(1-b). Therefore the decisions by the multinational 
to invest abroad affect capital assimilation rates.
Clearly this formulation with populations sizes in the denominator remove scale effects. While 
the assimilation rate depends on how well evenly the North and South capital is spread in the 
North and the South’s firms.
Let us consider the financial sectors, and the values of innovators and imitators to be:
 Vi,N, vi,S and vc,S  vc,N
A new blueprint’s cost in the North (South), depends positively on the difficulty of innovation 
and negatively on the amount of knowledge capital in the North (South).
Therefore: NNNi Kawv /
NNN
c Kacwv /
SSS
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SSS
c Kacwv /
(9)
In the North, the typical firm in production will be copied by the South in time interval dt with the 
probability dtnn NSc  /
This gives the no-arbitrage condition whereby the multinational operates an arbitrage between 
investing in risk less bonds, innovative and imitated goods.
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The model is closed with a labor market equilibrium condition for each region with producers, 
innovators dynamic equilibrium and consumer’s static equilibrium:
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Before describing the equilibrium in different phases of innovation and imitation, let us examine 
the effect of profit maximizing on the innovation.
Let us describe the equilibrium in four phases of development and then describe the effect on the 
transition between the four different phases of the multinational’s choices of investment in the 
South capital and in the North capital.
We first want to analyze the impact of the reallocation of capital due to profit maximizing onto 
respective countries knowledge capital, or more precisely respective countries’ innovations.
Optimally, the maximization of the knowledge capital in each country would lead to maximize 
the expression in the knowledge capital )1(..)..1(   sorn .where this expression 
is the rate of assimilation of one’s country knowledge capital by the other.
We would find 0.5 as the optimal value for each country.
How about after the profit maximization?
We obtain: 
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(13)
We clearly see that maximizing this expression in alpha amounts to the conclusion that the both 
country optimization is equal to one country’s optimization of knowledge capital in which case 
we would have α=0.5 so as to maximize the expression in the knowledge capital 
)1(..)..1( bbsoraan   .where this expression is the rate of assimilation of oune’s 
country knowledge capital by the other.
Clearly here ..5...5.  ba doesn’t satisfy the maximization of this equation, taken into 
consideration that numerical simulations give that:
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Where this expression is the result of differentiation by a, b and setting the equations f ‘(a) and f 
‘(b) =0.
We don’t find a, b=0.5 to be optimal.
Therefore inertial factors such as population size, current sector lead, and wages difference will 
decide on the ratio of a,b which is optimal for the multinational but not optimal for one of the host 
countries.
Proposition 1:
The cross country allocation of knowledge capital through international investment does affect 
the international equilibrium of innovations.
We observe first that in case the knowledge capital in the North should have increased, to 
maintain a constant profit, the multinational should have re-equilibrated its portfolio with more of 
b and less of a, or more of a and less of b depending on the ratio of knowledge capital between 
the North and the South.
Second, we observe that if the difference in population size is large and if the gap between the 
North and the South is a large gap, then a will be negatively affected and b positively affected by 
an increase in these differences. 
We next set out to study one of the 4 phases of development. 
The phase with imitation only in the South is obtained with ni,s=0 and suppressing the arbitrage 
condition (11).
The phase with innovation only in the South is obtained with nc,s=0 and suppressing the other 
arbitrage condition (11).
Proposition 2:
There is no wide-gap equilibrium with both imitation and innovation in the South.
Indeed, in such a case, where the South is price-dominant, it would fix the same price for imitated 
or innovative goods; but since Southern innovation is more costly than in the North, the South
would have no rational to innovate.
Let us now consider the case where there is a narrow-gap with both innovation and imitation in 
the South, and both innovation and imitation in the North.
Using the demand equation and pricing equations and the expression of profits, ignoring the 
effects of capital reallocation between countries, and ignoring the differences between the tastes 
parameters and elasticity of substitution due to segmentation of markets, we would obtain:
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   )/()/(/ SNNcScNcSc wwppxx  where both conduct limit pricing to adapt to the original 
leading edge competitor’s price, that is one charges wn/α and the other charges wn, to evict the 
former.
    )()/(/ NiScNiSc ppxx
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                                                                                                            (14)
K is the ratio of knowledge capital.
Let )]1)(1(/[)]1)(1([ NSSN KbbKKaaKk                   
In steady state, product shares and k are constant, and the total market value for each production 
sector is constant.
Therefore we obtain the expression  ),,,( bakKfK SN               (14bis)
 Using (19), (8) and (7) (6) (12)we may determine that the values of a, b in steady state depend on 
the number of steady state innovation and imitation industries, on population differential, on 
wage differential and not on capital previously accumulated.
Proposition 3:
In steady state, the decisions of investing abroad are not taken on a basis of the differential of 
capital knowledge, but on the basis of population differences, and relative number of edge 
sectors, and due to the differential in wages:
A positive differential of population for the South will ceteris paribus increase the proportion of 
Northern capital invested in the South and decrease the proportion of Southern capital invested in 
the North.
A positive differential of innovative sectors for the South will ceteris paribus decrease the 
proportion of Northern capital invested in the South and decrease the proportion of Southern 
capital invested in the North.
Let us again as we did for the different elasticities of substitution, withdraw the consideration that 
Northern capital and Southern capital mix to produce greater assimilation rate, to focus on the 
four phases of development.
Now let us introduce some more notations: Let NS www / (terms of trade of innovative 
goods).                                                                                                (15)
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Let NSc nnc / be the rate at which the South copies the North.     (17)
Let SNc nnd / be the rate at which the North copies the South.    (18)
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i  /////  (18bis) since product 
shares are constant.
Moreover, since the total market value of each production sector is constant, 
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Considering that the populations are the same size, we obtain using (6) (7) and (8):
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Where clearly this becomes )1())1((1 aancg Sc
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Next, we differentiate SK with respect to time, using the definition and setting k=0 at steady state 
gives the steady state of k: 
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Resulting in: 
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obtained after we have derived inside the integral and on the integral itself.
Thus, replacing Ni
N
C
S
i nnn  ,, we obtain:
)/(.1   ggk Ni    (21)
In the steady state, we have  SN rr .
Combining the no arbitrage conditions (10,11) (2,3,4,5) with 14 and (18bis) we get a relationship 
between :
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We then equate the first two relations and the next two relations.(23)
Finally putting together these equations (19), (21), (22), (23), we obtain together with the steady 
state of the labor market condition (12) yields 9 equations for the steady states of the nine 
endogenous variables dcgwk Sc
N
c
S
i
N
i ,,,,,,,, 
To examine the possibility of transition between the three equilibrium of (i)
Southern imitation only, (ii) Southern imitation and innovation and (iii) Southern
Innovation only, (iiii) it is useful to think in terms of changes in the parameters ac/a
and kappa, reflecting the relative cost of copying and the speed at which the South absorbs 
knowledge capital from the North.
The boundary for the South between imitation only, and innovation and imitation is the 
values of ac/a and kappa such that Si =0.
The boundary for the South between imitation and innovation, and innovation only is the 
values of ac/a and kappa such that Sc =0=c.
The boundary for the North between innovation, and innovation and imitation  is the values 
of ac/a and kappa such that Nc =0=d.
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III. A theory on Human Capital versus Immigration:
The effect of jobs delocalization from the North to the South is to push wages up of skilled 
workers in the North and the South and increase the strain on the pool of skilled workers in the 
North and the South.
As South economies converge towards those of the North, standards of living in the South may 
increase more relatively than in the North, considering that non tradable goods do not catch up 
quite as fast.
This hypothesis is not taken into account into today’s literature and we have tried to account for 
its effects.
Next, Skilled workers according to standard North-South models supposedly would be 
maximizing their utility according to the quantity of goods they may consume irrespectively from 
the North or the South.
Let us differentiate between a skilled cultural factor and a skilled non cultural factor. 
The process of delocalization can be seen as delocalizing only the component which is not 
cultural in a product.
Indeed, the cultural factor will be the design corresponding to the local taste.
Acculturation is a process which is taking place during the delocalization process.
 Just like products are reverse-engineered, the culture is reverse-engineered in such a way that the 
pool of North cultural skilled workers in the South increase relative to the pool of non 
cultural skilled workers.
It means that the South workers who become cultural adopt more expensive customs, lifestyles 
and find it more attractive to move to the North where they have access to better quality products.
At equilibrium, the utility of North and South skilled workers must be the same.
Yet, because the cost of living in the South remains lower than in the North, skilled workers in 
the South are ready to accept a lower salary, to stay in the South.
Therefore, with continued delocalization, the fact that there are non tradable goods that do not 
catch up as fast as other goods may induce skilled workers from the North to come back to the 
South.
While a counter factor would increase the relative cost of skilled non cultural workers in the 
South, since its acculturation, creates for the worker new needs and expectation, and it therefore 
may reduce delocalization.
This argumentative may lead multi-nationals to reconsider investing abroad, since their 
investment will induce acculturation and therefore deplete their pool of available resources in the 
South and therefore increase their costs.
This leads clearly to the process of endogenous qualified labor migration.
32
IV. North South models and Exchange rates:
We are going to study a very basic framework of North South models in which we will 
attempt to introduce exchange rates:
We follow the usual model of vertical ladder  

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djdsjpmsjxmEs  and since M(j,s) is the M quality good at time t, 
mom pmopm  //   when mo is the least quality, the value of the objective 
becomes
PmosjEmo /),(  This is the result of the static intra-industry optimization.
Dynamic optimization leads to :
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Production:
We follow the product cycle idea by Vernon 1966, except that the equilibrium 
wswnws   becomes RwswnwsR  where R is the real exchange rate between the 
North and the South, and where this equilibrium is being used to discriminate leaders, followers 
and imitators in the North and the South,
Following the definition of the Real Exchange Rate, R=S.Ps/Pn
Here ).)(1()().( SwswnSwsPs  
-Where the 3 sectors are a non tradable sector ψ, tradable and non monopolistic sector ω, tradable 
and monopolistic sector 1- ψ – ω.
).)(1(..)( SwsSwswnPn  
-Where the 3 sectors are a non tradable sector ξ, tradable and non monopolistic sector φ, tradable 
and monopolistic sector 1- ξ – φ.
Indeed, some goods are tradable and some are not, yet the purchasing power of currency must be 
equivalent on both the tradable and non tradable goods.
Let us take R=Ps/Pn and S=1, the equilibrium becomes:
wsPnPswnwsPnPs ././ 
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This relation leads to after developing the terms and adding both unequal relations:
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We find that an increase in ws, leads to a decrease of ).)1()1(( 2   , 
a decrease in non tradable in the South and an increase of non monopolistic tradable.
A a futher topic of research, we would like to incorporate the effects of readjusting exchange 
rates on qualified labor migration patterns. 
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V. A Review: Push-Pull Migration Laws
Following the idea of acculturation which may be seen as an incentive or even a necessity for 
South skilled workers to immigrate, a model of migration has been developed.
Since the Geographer’s Ravenstein ideas, immigration is the resultant of a push and pull factors 
discounted by a distance deterrence between the places.
Push stands for local dissatisfaction while pull stands for foreign attraction.
M
ij 
= (R
i 
+ E
j
) / d
ij 
, i ≠ j
Movement M, Repulsion R, Enticing E, Distance Factor d
Aggregating this equation over r places gives:
Where Oi and Ij are In-sums and Out-sums.
A true push factor might be a high unemployment rate, whose cost is yet reduced by the heavy 
inertial cost of leaving friends and families.
The overall push factor may even be negative. In the same way, an attractive place may have a 
large positive Push value (Lee 1966).
VI. A Review: INNOVATION, IMITATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS: INTRODUCING MIGRATION IN HELPMAN’S MODEL
Debasis Mondal† and Manash Ranjan Gupta introduce international labor mobility into the 
Helpman(1993) North-South model.
 They analyze the effect of strengthening the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) protection in the 
South on the rate of product innovation in the North and on the North-South relative wages. Two 
cases are differentiated:
In one case South based imitated products do not contribute to the knowledge capital in the North
and in the other case they do contribute. In the first case, the strengthening of IPR must produce a 
positive effect on the rate of innovation. In the second case, this positive effect may be obtained
Since the 1994 GATT conference, in Marrakech, the developed countries agreed some form of 
free trade with developing countries as long as the latter kept a tight regulation on intellectual 
property rights.
The North-South models are based on the Grossman and Helpman (1991a, 1991b) Product 
variety framework and quality ladder framework.
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These models consider that innovation takes place in the North and imitation in the South, and 
assume a steady growth rate.
In the 1993 model and in Lai 1998 or Hassani 2005, imitation rate is exogenous, proportional to 
the number of goods imported from the North and reverse engineered for instance.
Grossman and Helpman (1991b) did not consider the multi nationalization of Northern firms and 
in their model imitation is assumed to be direct. In Lai (1998), the Southern
firms can imitate only after multi nationalization of the Northern firms.
Moreover, in Grossman and Helpman, more IPR in the South leads to a fall in innovation in the 
North.
Finally, contrary to Lai 1998, the rate of imitation will fall due to stronger IPR protection if multi
nationalization is the channel of production transfer.
Dollar(1986) in his North-South model of product cycle assumes the absence of international 
knowledge spillover though he does not analyze the effect of strengthening IPR on the 
endogenous growth rate. In this case the Southern products do not contribute to the knowledge 
capital formation in the North. Baldwin et. al.(2001) also considers a similar case.
The Model:
The level of migration varies positively with the North-South relative wage. As opposed to 
Helpman(1993) who has shown that the strengthening of IPR in the South lowers the rate of 
innovation in the North, the model shows that the policy of strengthening of IPR in the South
must raise the rate of innovation in the North in the absence of international knowledge spillover 
and may raise it in the case of perfect international knowledge spillover.
Model:
The representative consumer in the North maximizes its welfare subject to inter-temporal budget 
constraint: 
UN is a C.E.S.
n(t) are varieties available while xN is the level of consumption of the zth variety.
Dynamic Resolution gives 
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While static Solving gives:  and 
Taken under the budget constraint:  
n
jpjx
0
)()(
Here 
 , since the North is a profit maximizing capitalist while the 
South is a Bertrand Competition player.
Here, the volume of migration depends on relative North South wages where f(w) and f’(w) 
>0.
Therefore AND w = wN/wS
In the North, the Labor Market is 
Of employees into the production of the Northern varieties and in Research.
Since imitation is costless, .
The South consumer operates the same maximization under his own utility, budget constraint, 
and does not operate dynamic allocation since there is no R&D, all savings go to the consumption 
of new varieties as the imitation cost is null.
They find an aggregate demand to be
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Therefore 
and 
Here the main knowledge spillover is where the numerator is the 
knowledge capital.
1 corresponds to Helpman while  =0 corresponds to Dollar.
Finally, 
And Ns nmtn */   where m = m* -µ
(cost of developing a blue print).
The no-arbitrage condition is 
Conclusions of steady growth: 
Expressing , , , allows to solve for 
if lambda =0 and if lambda = 1.
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Tanking lambda =0, 
At steady state,  and it is a saddle point.
Differentiation with respect to m  we find that 
 and since , <0.
And < 0.
Proposition 1:
More IPR in the South will lead to a higher share of Nn relative to N and increase therefore 
North’s innovation.
Moreover, more labor will flow from the South to North due to the differential in wages.
Taking lambda =1, we arrive to the conclusion that:
Proposition 2:
For economies that are initially in the steady state, a policy of strengthening IPR in the South will 
raise the rate of innovation in the North if α -> 0 and will lower it if α -> 1.
As alpha tends towards 0, the monopolist may charge an infinitely high price, reducing the 
quantity produced in the North and the manufacturing labor in the North.
However since the relative wage increase in favor of the North, the excess labor coming from the 
South will move into the North research sector increasing innovation.
VII. A Review: Dinopoulos Model:
It differentiates an open (to trade) North and South, versus a closed South. Globalization is 
defined as a closed South modifying its trade policy. How can the world compete against such 
countries as China opening up with an extensive and qualified labor force?
Although delocalization is translated by a shift of production to the South, the North producers 
also beneficiate from a larger global consumer base, while consumers take advantage of lower 
prices and increased competition.
Which effect dominates the evolution of the relative North South wage gap?
Using 
1/)/1
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1
0
)),,([)( 

   dtjdtu j
sjM
m
; A vertical quality ladder utility function;
J quality product in industry  at time t, where the exponential for   traduces a wish for higher 
quality products.
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Results are that globalization leads only to a temporary increase in the global innovation rate, on 
the way to steady state. Yet copying increases permanently and so does the South wage, relative 
to the North, since although the North has a higher consumer base, so does the South.
A second effect is the increase in IPR which decreases (North) innovation on the way to steady 
state, and decreases imitation and therefore the South wage relative to the North.
VIII. A Review: A Theory of defensive Skill-Biased Innovation and Globalization
              Mathias Thoenig, Thierry Verdier
Skilled labor intensive technologies are the response of firms to globalization and induced 
increased threats of leapfrogging.
The article shows that this process generates an increase in wage inequalities in both regions
(North-North Trade or North-South Trade).
(2)
Where l/k stands for skilled labor adjusted to human capital and h would be non skilled labor.
K takes values 1 or s>1 according to the intensity of skill required in the technology.
                         (3)
The cost function for s is higher than for K=1.Yet some firms will still be induced to use this 
technology as a result of trade integration.
The ratio of the minimization of the marginal cost of the unskilled and skilled workers gives the 
optimal ratio: (4)
Hence technology s is more skill 
intensive that technology K =1.
Given that (rate of capital 
deprecation; case where k=1)
And 
, it follows that neutral technical change is a 
priori more efficient than biased technical change.
Suppose that in a sector i, the incumbent produces a good with technology k=1.
A new monopoly uses limit pricing.
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In the first case, both firms use the technology K = 1, cash flows are given by 
with a corresponding Bellman equation 
In the second case, they use different technologies s and k=1 with a corresponding cash flow of 
. And the corresponding Bellman equation without leapfrogging 
is (is independent on the loss that would be caused 
by innovation θ).
Henceforth, defensive skill based innovation depends on Vst < Vlt.
Let the probability of instantaneous discovery be teta and cost c*teta.
Free entry into the R&D sector ensures that 
Where (5) the effort in R&D is concentrated on the k=1 industries, the others 
not requiring R&D because not risking competition.
The dynamics of alpha is (6) (the effort will decrease if the likelihood of 
innovation increases and if the value of skill based production increases, since it allows to be 
protected from innovational changes or leapfrogging)
(7)
The wage premium q/w = H/L is shown to be decreasing with alpha and 
the relative cost is also 
decreasing with alpha.
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Let us analyze steady state: computing Vs and Vl is straightforward and  holds.
Equivalent to  (8)
This figure represents a negative relationship between alpha and theta, meaning that a 
higher likelihood of innovation will reduce the effort in R&D. 
It represents the no bias condition (8), the research resource constraint (5).
Trade integration leads to a larger endowment (nc countries), and the research resource constraint 
moves up right leading to a lower equilibrium of innovation effort
IX. A Review: Globalization and gains from variety:
Christian Broda and David Weinstein show in the path of Krugman (1979) that the increase in the 
number of imported varieties has been by a factor of four and that such contributed to much of the 
gains from trade. Moreover, estimating different elasticities of substitution across industries , 
through time, they obtain a price index and an upward bias in the conventional price index of 
1.2% per year (adjusting for new varieties, import prices have been falling 1.2 percent per year 
faster). As such, this increase in imported varieties has contributed to 2.8% of the US GDP in the 
last 30 years.
  
First, consumers have low elasticities of substitution across similar goods produced
in different countries; which proves the validity of Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) framework valuing 
variety.
How can a price reflect variety? 
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Hausman (1981) estimates the price drop in terms of a new good‘s apparition. Moreover, 
according to Romer (1994) all goods enter utility identically.
Broda and al follow Feenstra (1994) which analyses the impact of variety on price index.; using a 
more consistent set of data, and compute estimates of elasticities of substitution.
Some results important to analysis of consumer bias for traded and non traded goods, show that 
the median elasticity of substitution has fallen over time indicating that traded goods have 
become more differentiated.
Elasticity of substitution is obtained by regressing bilateral trade flows on various control 
variables and a measure of trade costs (e.g., Romer (1994) and Hummels (1999)).
The coefficient on trade costs is used as the elasticity of substitution among varieties.
One issue of such assumption is that countries care about import responses when cutting bilateral 
tariffs, and that movements in non-tariff barriers are correlated with movements in tariffs.
Therefore this calculation ignores wether the increase in trade costs derive from a change in 
the consumer demand, or wether a change in consumer demand induces a change in 
elasticity of substitution.
A variety constitutes the production of a particular good in a particular country Armington 
(1969).
In the comparative advantage continuum of goods models, consumers are indifferent about where 
a good is produced as long as the price does not vary.
Therefore, at fixed price, elasticities of substitution are infinite, in sharp difference to Krugman’s 
where elasticities of substitution are small.
For the purpose of the article, low elasticities of substitution across varieties are a necessary 
condition for increases in the number of varieties to be a source
of potential gain.
The monopolistic competition model described in Krugman (1979 and
1980) suggests two clear channels for the gains from trade arising from variety growth. The first 
is through reductions in trade costs. If trade costs fall, countries will gain through the import of 
new varieties. The second is through growth of the foreign country. A rise in its labor force will 
produce more varieties, and this will also be a source of gain for the home country. These gains 
are in sharp contrast to the gains postulated by comparative advantage models. In these models, 
all goods are consumed in equilibrium regardless of the level of trade costs or the size of the 
foreign country. Hence, in comparative advantage models, all gains from reductions in trade costs 
or increases in the size of a foreign country are achieved through conventional movements. in 
prices and not through changes in the number of goods. One of the distinguishing features of 
the Krugman model is that a country may gain from trade even though there are not price
changes.
Part of the explanation of the current US deficit is the rise of its imports  due to reductions in 
trade costs, relaxations of capital controls (e.g. barriers to foreign direct investment), and the 
relative growth of many East Asian and other economies outside of the United States.
The Feenstra Price Index (1994) allows for varieties and quality changes. 
As in Helpman and Krugman (1996), Ch.6:
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Here gamma stands for the elasticity of substitution amongst 1-Nt imnported goods.
Bgt is taste parameter, alpha is the share of domestic goods.
When decomposing Mgt good in varieties:
Cgt is the set of countries supplying the good. A rise in gct d raises the demand for good g from 
country c. σ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties.
The minimum cost function is defined as the minimum expenditure required to buy one unit of 
the bundle of imported goods, Mgt, given the prices of the different import goods.
Clearly it is obtained by maximizing Mgt by mgct under constraint from   1mgctpgct
Supposing Vg varieties of good g are available to consumers, and dgc=1, the cost function 
becomes symmetric. All varieties become equally priced at pg, and the minimum cost function 
becomes .
Vg the minimum cost to maintain utility decreases.
In turn, the minimum cost of the main utility m ay be expressed as:
As demonstrated in Feenstra (1994), the exact price index, where there is a set of
varieties g I ≠that are available in both periods, and for which the taste parameters are
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constant; depending on the change in the price of imported goods, of the difference in 
consumption quantities; 
is therefore the price
 index of the overlapping quantities Pg(Ig) times an additional term(fraction of expenditure over 
available varieties in both periods).
Here again the authors demonstrate that the higher the expenditure share of new varieties, the 
lower is  gt, and the smaller is the exact price index relative to the conventional price index.
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